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Critical Discussions

TED COHEN ON SHARING THE WORLD

by Michael Fischer

I

n “Stanley Cavell and the Limits of Appreciation,” Ted Cohen
restates his hatred of Richard Wagner’s music. Cohen hears something “very nasty” in Wagner’s music, “an element of Nazism,” to borrow
Thomas Mann’s phrase for what Mann, too, found disturbing in Wagner.1
Whereas Mann was still able to value Wagner’s music, Cohen despises
listening to it. Cohen realizes that his revulsion sets him apart not only
from Mann but also from W. H. Auden, who praised Wagner’s “consummate skill” in creating heroes and heroines who exhibit the irrationality
and self-destructiveness of human nature “in all its formidable enchantment.”2 Cohen notes how another eminent listener, Arturo Toscanini,
also thought Wagner’s music worth performing, not repulsive.
Faced with conflicting judgments of an artist or work of art, some
critics have tried to defuse the disagreement by adopting a live-and-letlive approach, aligning aesthetic judgments with critics’ unimpeachable
personal preferences. According to this familiar approach, there is no
disputing taste in art, but there is no need to. Absent any pressure to
achieve consensus, let alone unanimity, we can agree to disagree about
art without any harm. Different opinions of a work of art can coexist
peacefully, side by side, neither threatening nor contesting one another,
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like the frankly subjective reviews of restaurants, products, and resorts
aggregated by various websites.
Another, more sophisticated, way of dealing with aesthetic disagreement has been to intervene, not by picking one point of view and
arguing for its superiority but by pruning discordant judgments of the
underlying external interests assumed to be producing conflict. This
response recalls Immanuel Kant, who claimed critics can speak with a
universal voice and expect assent from others, but only by keeping their
judgments of art disinterested and purely aesthetic. From this point
of view, in the dispute over Wagner, Cohen’s invoking “an element of
Nazism” illustrates the discord that can break out when controversial
political and ethical considerations disrupt the discussion of art. Tarring
Wagner’s music with Nazism becomes inflammatory, prejudicial, and out
of order. I can imagine a Kantian mediator of this debate trying to reset
it by urging the disputants to refocus their comments on aesthetic issues.
The hope would be that factoring out irrelevant, incendiary political
concerns might calm the discussion and reduce the unnecessary tension
sparked by mixing art and politics.
Contemplating his strong disagreement with prominent advocates
for Wagner, Cohen doesn’t take either one of these tacks. He neither
opts for a let-a-thousand-flowers-bloom relativism nor does he recant his
invocation of Nazism. Cohen accepts the legitimacy of different perspectives on Wagner (his own very much included) but he does not leave
it at that. He feels he must somehow incorporate into his own outlook
the fact that others disagree with him; they should do the same with his
antipathy toward Wagner. Here is Cohen’s striking conclusion:
My claim is that the Wagnerite is perfectly legitimate in his enjoyment
of this music, and in his capacity to overlook the anti-Semitism in the
operas, but that he is no more legitimate than I in my disgust. My world
is one in which the music of Wagner is distasteful. Your world is one in
which the music of Wagner is endlessly engaging. I have to find room in
my world for you and your Wagner along with me and my Wagner. If I
don’t, then I forfeit my claim to human, moral responsibility, for it comes
with an obligation not to write you off, not to consign you to some other
world I have nothing to do with. It has to mean something in my world
that you are in it loving Wagner, for after all, the world is no more mine
than yours. (p. 158)

For Cohen, at stake in this disagreement over Wagner is nothing less
than our capacity to live together and share the world with one another,
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fully aware of our differences. Drawing on Stanley Cavell, Cohen goes on
to note that our willingness to share the world with others is registered
by our willingness to engage in conversation with them, conversation
being “a way—perhaps the way—in which people simply are with one
another” (p. 158).
I want here to applaud Cohen’s response to aesthetic disagreement
and the moral pressure he puts on himself to share the world with others who differ from him. That pressure comes from what Cohen sees
as his obligation not to write others off, not to shut them out of his
world, only because they disagree with him. “For after all,” he says in
a comment worth repeating, “the world is no more mine than yours.”
My deep appreciation for this conclusion is tied to my conviction that
it is vital to democracy, especially now, when we face the resurgence of
a politics defined by writing some people off, expelling them, silencing them, or otherwise keeping them from making a difference in the
world—an autocratic politics, in short, bent on owning, not sharing, the
world, on fencing it off and having it all to oneself on one’s own terms.
Without mentioning democracy, Cohen hints at the connection I’m
making between sharing the world and democratic politics when in the
final section of his essay he turns to some lessons learned from game
playing. He credits his brother Stephen with the insight that sore losers
“never seem to feel that you’ve won” (p. 162): “They feel that they’ve
lost, and would have won if only they had played their best, or the
sun hadn’t been blinding, or the umpire had been accurate, or whatever. Thus they depreciate you and your victory” (pp. 162–63). In the
antidemocratic politics that rejects sharing the world with others, sore
losing often means depreciating the opposition party and their victory,
say, by contesting the opposition’s legitimacy and questioning their very
right to play the political game. This questioning can take many forms,
including groundless allegations of fraudulent voting, dark insinuations
about rigged elections, angry complaints about biased court decisions,
and lies about a victorious opponent’s qualifications—anything to sow
distrust in an unwelcome outcome. These tactics fly in the face of what
Cohen calls (thinking of game playing) “the need to live with them even
through winning and losing” (p. 163).
In my view, “the need to live with them even through winning and
losing” is also crucial to democracy, as Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt
point out in their important book How Democracies Die, one of several
recent books expressing concern for the future of American democracy.3
Levitsky and Ziblatt offer several key indicators of authoritarian behavior
in leaders, including:
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Lack of commitment to the democratic rules of the game. “Do [these
leaders] attempt to undermine the legitimacy of elections, for example,
by refusing to accept credible electoral results?” (HDD, p. 23)
Denial of the legitimacy of political opponents. “Do they baselessly
describe their partisan rivals as criminals, whose supposed violation of
the law [or potential to do so] disqualifies them from full participation
in the political arena?” (p. 23)
Toleration or encouragement of violence. “Have they tacitly endorsed
violence by their supporters by refusing to unambiguously condemn it
and punish it?” (p. 24)
Readiness to curtail civil liberties of opponents, including media. “Have
they threatened to take legal or other punitive action against critics in
rival parties, civil society, or the media?” (p. 24)

These specific actions undermine what Levitsky and Ziblatt identify
as two essential cultural norms or “soft guardrails” (HDD, p. 101)
underwriting a healthy democracy: mutual tolerance and forbearance.
Mutual tolerance mitigates against sore losing by honoring the need
to live with one’s political opponents even when they come out ahead:
the need to acknowledge one’s opponents as legitimate participants in
the political process entitled to win, not treasonous foes or intolerable
threats. Forbearance counteracts ungracious winning by honoring the
need to live with one’s opponents even after defeating them. Winners
of elections exemplify forbearance when, out of respect for an ongoing relationship with the other side, they are generous, not vindictive.
They refrain from seizing on their current electoral ascendancy as an
opportunity for total, permanent control, or a long-sought-after chance
to squelch their political rivals once and for all. Mutual tolerance and
forbearance combine to fortify the central social vision of democracies
that I think Cohen’s conclusion reinforces: individuals and groups sharing the world with people who differ from them, creating that world
together, talking with them, and benefiting from relationships that
encourage disagreement, independent thinking, and dissent.
Cohen’s conclusion grows out of his response to a disagreement over
Wagner, which may at first glance restrict its transferability to politics,
where much more seems to be at stake. As if responding to this caution, Cohen goes on to consider another kind of conflict that matters
to him: disagreement with someone over abortion. This disagreement
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is potentially harder to stomach and on the face of it more applicable
to the acrimonious world of actual politics. Cohen is pro-choice, a
position that he knows others passionately reject. He realizes that the
abortion debate, in contrast to an aesthetic disagreement, has “to play
out differently, because now it is not merely a matter of acknowledging
the legitimacy of one another’s feelings, because something will have to be
done” (p. 160): laws have to be voted on, court rulings issued, funding
decisions determined. But after acknowledging this difference between
debating abortion and a work of art, Cohen refuses to let it nullify the
conclusion he arrives at when faced with opposition to his dislike of
Wagner:
But something has to be done [in the debate over abortion], and what
the pro-choicers want done is not what the pro-lifers want done. It is one
thing for you to enjoy Wagner’s music while I avoid it, and for both of us
to credit one another with humanity and dignity, and quite another for
us to engage in this mutual acceptance when something has been done
that the other despises. And yet, surely, this is exactly what has to be done
unless our conversation is to end and we are to be resigned, truly, to be
in a war of all against all. This is not an easy thing to do (it is not really
all that easy for the Wagner-lovers and Wagner-haters to share a musical
world), and I do not know that it is possible to do it. I do know that it has
to be attempted, and that forsaking the attempt is no less than forsaking
the idea that we might live together. (p. 160)

Even when something has to be done and people differ strongly about
what course of action to take, as in the debate over abortion, the underlying challenge for Cohen remains the same: “What are we to do to remain
together when we cannot agree?” (p. 159). His answer: try to summon
up the level of mutual acceptance that will allow us to continue to talk
to one another despite our deep differences.
Far from depending on agreement, the mutual acceptance Cohen
is affirming embraces conflict. Cohen is aligning social cohesion with
aesthetic disagreement, not fandom or people forming communities
that crystallize around their shared enthusiasm for a book or artist. As
Cohen puts it, “We cannot take agreement as the only sign this appreciation [of one another] has been achieved” (p. 162). Cohen isn’t letting
go of his previous views or converting to an outlook he once dissented
from, in effect accepting self-censorship or hypocrisy as the price for
coexisting with others. That is the price exacted by autocratic leaders
who want to control the world, not share it: hence their penchant for
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extortion, loyalty tests, you’re-either-with-me-or-against-me ultimatums,
and other forms of coercion. That is a price Cohen refuses to pay. Instead
of abandoning his convictions, Cohen opts for continuing to express
them in exchanges with the pro-lifers and Wagnerites he disagrees with.
Conversation is his alternative to the war of all against all, the otherwise
unceasing power struggle that makes recourse to force inevitable.
A better word for conversation here might be quarreling. I take the
term from Linda M. G. Zerilli, who finds Kant using “quarreling” in his
Critique of Judgment to characterize what aesthetic disagreement sounds
like, or, in more Kantian language, how participants in aesthetic disputes
uphold different positions while claiming the right “to pronounce validly for everyone” without, however, invoking determinate concepts or
unassailable rules.4 “Quarreling” maps out a middle ground between a
no-holds-barred brawl, to be settled only by force, on the one hand, and,
at the other extreme, a dispute that potentially lends itself to objective
resolution, say, by appealing to agreed-upon standards and facts or by
deferring to broadly accepted authorities. Quarreling redeems disagreement, stays patient with it, and resists peremptory moves to cut short
the conversation, whether by force or fiat.
Quarreling takes on political dimension when, in A Democratic Theory
of Judgment, Zerilli, like Cohen, persuasively contends that arguing over
aesthetic judgments has much in common with contesting political
opinions. Participating in a democracy entails individuals figuring out,
sharing, defending, and sometimes revising their responses to the many
issues that come their way. Declaring “this war should not be fought” or
“this legislation is unfair” resembles asserting “this painting is beautiful”
or “this music is unbearable.” In both aesthetic and political debates,
quarreling captures how a high level of disagreement over specific
conclusions can coexist with an ongoing relationship between the very
people who oppose one another. As Zerilli suggests, whether they are
wrangling over art or politics, disputants keep talking to one another,
not because they agree on everything but because they rely on shared
patterns of support in advocating for their divergent positions.5 These
patterns of support are directive and accommodating, evidence providing
yet open-ended; they shore up a particular position while respecting the
freedom of others to reach a different conclusion. More specifically, a
participant in an aesthetic or political debate is always soliciting, urging,
and hoping for agreement from others without, however, presuming
to demand it. Inviting assent (as opposed to compelling it) takes many
forms, including asking others to clarify the criteria they are using to
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reach their conclusions and inviting others to try to see for themselves
what you see in a painting or proposal. As an example, consider Cohen
inviting other listeners to hear something “very nasty” in Wagner’s music
while exploring with them why they either do not hear it or, hearing it,
why they minimize the damage Cohen is sure it does to Wagner’s music.
Here, then, is how I view the relationship I see Cohen aspiring to
have with the Wagner enthusiasts and pro-life advocates he disagrees
with: an unending quarrel punctuated by moments of convergence
and separation, mutual attunement and incomprehension, hope for
consensus and frustration, a quarrel sustained by the noncoercive patterns of support both sides adduce to back up their divergent positions.
Whatever outcomes result from this exchange, Zerilli reminds us that
one is especially important to democracy. By sharing the world and
talking to one another in this way, we are also creating our world as a
place where we can live with disagreement and resist taking arms against
one another because we differ. Cohen reinforces this insight by showing
how disagreement can become a sign of caring, of showing others that
their opinions matter enough for us to keep talking with them, thus
reaffirming that “the world is no more mine than yours.”
There remains the serious problem of imperious people who feel they
own the world and resist sharing it, who refuse to reciprocate Cohen’s
large-mindedness and make room for his anti-Wagner or pro-choice views
in their lives. Instead of inviting assent to their various positions, these
people demand it. They resort to force and reject the right of others,
Cohen included, to have a voice in how they say things are going to be.
As we have seen, among the many varieties of authoritarianism seeking
to control the world on their own terms, one kind—Nazism—makes an
early appearance in Cohen’s essay as “an element” in Wagner’s music
that for Cohen discredits it. But Nazism, it’s worth emphasizing, also
exists in less rarefied or attenuated forms, not only as the hard-tomake-out undercurrent of a complex piece of music but as unabashed,
Jews-will-not-replace-us hatred, violence, and anger. The threat posed
by this virulent form of Nazism prompts Cohen to acknowledge, “Of
course, one can go too far with this thought”—“this thought” being
his own stated desire to share the world with people he disagrees with.
Cohen goes on to write, “Suppose my opponent is someone who wishes
to enact laws that would disenfranchise Jews, or maybe even kill them.
What can it mean to share my world with that person? Am I required
to appreciate him, and let it go at that?” (p. 162).
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Cohen finds a parallel in his aesthetic experience even for the urgent
questions raised by the threat of Nazism. He admits,
I can find a place in my world for those who love Wagner, and I expect
them to find a place in their worlds for me and my distaste for Wagner.
But it is much harder for me to locate someone who finds Beethoven
disagreeable. In fact I find it easier to keep company with someone who
likes no music at all than with someone who loves some music but can’t
stand Beethoven. (p. 162)

This comment risks trivializing Nazism by equating it with someone
disliking Beethoven. But Cohen is not saying that taste in music has the
same horrific consequences as an abhorrent political movement. He is
saying that for himself, that is, for someone who takes music seriously,
disliking Beethoven raises the same question as vicious anti-Semitism,
namely, how can I “keep company” with someone so far removed from
my own values? This question begets another: “how far is too far?” Cohen
concludes, “There is no rule for this, but it isn’t bad to deal with these
monstrosities as they come up, sizing up their monstrousness and seeing
whether one can live with them” (p. 162).
I think this is wise advice. Cohen calls not for abandoning judgment
but continuing to exercise it, “sizing up” the monstrosities that inevitably
surface in one’s world and calibrating the appropriate response to them,
presumably in conversations with others. Our response to the monsters
troubling our world can include deciding we cannot live with them and
we must do whatever we can to nullify their destructive influence. In
Thinking of Others: On the Talent for Metaphor Cohen reaffirms how the
imperative to appreciate or credit others even when they disagree with
us does not amount to giving them a blank check. It is always possible
in a conflict to discover “at the last stage, that there is nothing attractive to appreciate [in an opponent]. There is nothing there besides
ignorance, stupidity, or delusion. We cannot—should not—always give
in.”6 But even in these extreme cases, Cohen adds, “It is good to identify
the exact deficiency, and, perhaps, even to imagine what it is like to be
afflicted with it” (TO, p. 81). The imperative to understand others, not
automatically to write them off, is that strong.
As I have been arguing, that imperative shines through Cohen’s essay
and shapes his response to the people he clashes with, whether they
disrupt his world by loving Wagner, favoring bans on abortion, or by taking other positions that provoke him.7 Cohen defends the imperative to
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understand others by contrasting it to the incessant fighting that befalls
us if we quit trying to appreciate people whose views differ from our
own. More positively, Cohen suggests that aesthetic experience itself can
play a constructive role in motivating and equipping us to understand
others. He rounds out his essay on the limits of appreciation by asking:
What does it mean to appreciate someone else, and, in particular, someone
whose feelings are different? For a while I have been developing the thesis
that the ability to imagine oneself to be another is an absolute prerequisite
for the competent appreciation of much narrative art, and maybe other
art as well. It seems to me often required that one somehow put oneself
in touch with the feelings, say, of characters in a novel or movie, and that
one does this, if one can, by achieving a kind of imaginative identification with that character. It may also be required that one do this with an
artist, say a poet, in order to gain a robust sense of how things seem to
that person. (p. 161)

Cohen expands on the connection he makes between “the ability to fully
appreciate narrative fiction and the ability to participate in the morality
of life”: both, he argues, depend on “the ability to imagine oneself to
be someone else” (TO, p. 73). Cohen is not saying that engaging with
narrative fiction and other forms of art pays off in immediate, automatic moral attentiveness. Instead, I hear him suggesting that the moral
influence of literature and the arts is indirect, gradual, and cumulative,
more like the benefits of everyday physical exercise than dramatic, lifetransforming surgery. As Elaine Scarry has said along similar lines, “It’s
not that I read [a work of literature] and then go out and care about
more people.” Nevertheless, by fostering “a greater pliancy of thinking,
a greater openness to the concerns of others,” literature and the other
arts can strengthen our willingness to let others count in our lives.8
By tying our engagement with the arts, especially narrative art, to our
capacity for appreciating how someone else feels, Cohen’s argument
comes full circle. The very arts that inspire disagreement provide us
with the resources for dealing with it. This is another conclusion that
speaks to our stewardship of democracy. I value how recent writing on
the challenges facing American democracy has renewed appreciation
for the cultural influences and “soft guardrails,” to repeat a phrase
from How Democracies Die, necessary to sustain democratic values.9
This expansive understanding of democracy—as depending on more
than elections, laws, institutions, and constitutions—recalls Alexis de
Tocqueville’s Democracy in America, where he famously called attention
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to the “habits of the heart” citizens must cultivate for democracy to take
root and flourish. According to Tocqueville, citizens develop—or fail
to develop—these habits of the heart in everyday interactions with one
another: in neighborhoods, workplaces, schools, volunteer organizations,
and other places where they gather every day.10 Danielle Allen extends
this crucial line of thought when she calls for cultivating “practices of
political friendship” in Talking to Strangers: Anxieties of Citizenship since
“Brown v. Board of Education.” Allen reminds us,
Trust is not something that politicians alone can create. It grows only
among citizens as they rub shoulders in daily life—in supermarkets, at
movie theaters, on buses, at amusement parks, and in airports—and
wherever they participate in maintaining an institution, whether a school,
a church, or a business. How can we successfully generate trust in these
contexts?11

To fortify democracy, all individuals have a responsibility to nurture
mutual respect in the many contexts where they interact.
Cohen deserves immense credit for identifying the social reception
of the arts as an important context in which we can develop democratic
responses to conflict.12 As I have shown, he starts out with a specific
aesthetic disagreement, then uses it to explore how we might be able to
share the world with the people who differ from us. By staying open to
other points of view, Cohen keeps alive forms of interaction that offset
the endless zero-sum vying for personal advantage that would otherwise
consume even more of our lives—the war of all against all that autocratic leaders thrive on. Here is one more reason for valuing Cohen’s
work and the engagement with the arts he so passionately championed.
Trinity University
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